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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THELMA B. STANTON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES LAWRENCE STANTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF . 
CASE "NO. 14268 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Thelma B. Stanton, plaintiff and respondent herein, 
respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing, on the 
following grounds: 
1. The court's decision evades the mandate of the 
United States Supreme Court and violates the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI, United States Constitution. 
2. The majority of the court failed to follow the law 
of the case as established in the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
3. The court ignored the stipulation of the parties as 
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to the issue to be determined in this appeal. 
4. The court incorrectly assumed that the legislature 
had set the age of majority for purposes of support in 
divorce proceedings. 
5. The court incorrectly described the original decree 
as providing for support of "minor" children. 
6* The court's reversal and remand deprives plaintiff-
respondent of costs awarded to her by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
7. Justice Ellett should have disqualified himself in 
this case. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County awarding plaintiff-respondent $2,700, in-
terest, and costs, by virtue of child support that had accrued 
after the parties1 daughter had attained the age of 18 years. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The court in its decision on appeal held that the child 
support obligation of the defendant, James Lawrence Stanton, 
ended when his daughter reached the age of 18 years. The 
court refused to decide the age of majority that applies 
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to both males and females in divorce proceedings. It reversed 
the judgment of the trial court and awarded costs to defendant-
appellant, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 29, 1960, Honorable A. H. Ellett, then Judge 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, entered a Decree of 
Divorce which awarded to Mrs. Stanton the care and custody 
of the parties1 two children, and contained the following 
provision with respect to support and alimony: 
Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff 
the sum of $300 per month as child support and 
alimony, $100 per month for each child as child 
support and $100 per month as alimony, to be 
paid on or before the first day of each month 
through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk. 
On May 22, 1973, Mrs. Stanton filed a motion for entry 
of judgment against Mr. Stanton for $2,700 which represented 
support money for their daughter since her 18th birthday. 
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that 15-2-1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 set the age of majority for females 
at 18 years, and that the support obligation for the daughter 
terminated on her 18th birthday. This court upheld the 
trial court's ruling in Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 
517 P.2d 1010 (1974). 
- 3 -
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Mrs. Stanton appealed the decision to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, and on April 15f 1975, that court re-
versed the judgment, holding that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, in the context of divorce decreed support obligations, 
was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the 
laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 
1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975). In deciding the matter, the 
United States Supreme Court first disposed of the contentions 
that the support issue was moot and that Mrs. Stanton lacked 
standing, then said: 
We therefore conclude that under any test— 
compelling state interests, or rational basis, 
or something in between—§15-2-1, in the con-
text of child support, does not survive an 
equal protection attack. In that context, no 
valid distinction between male and female may 
be drawn. 
The court then held that a determination of the cige of majority 
for the purposes of divorce support obligations was a matter 
for the Utah courts and remanded the case "for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 
This court refused to decide the case when first re-
manded by the United States Supreme Court, and sent it to 
the District Court of Salt Lake County for further proceedings. 
- 4 -
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In the district court the parties stipulated "that the only 
matter for resolution was whether, in the context of divorce-
decreed child support obligations, children attain their 
majority at age 18 or at age 21", and that the plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment if the age of majority is 21 years. 
The district court decided that for purposes of child 
support, children attain their majority at age 21, granted 
plaintifffs motion, and entered judgment for $2,700 past-due 
support money, $508.80 interest, and $437.38 awarded to her 
as costs by the United States Supreme Court. 
This court reversed, holding that the establishment of 
the age of majority is a matter for the legislature. It 
refused to rule that a single age of majority applied to 
both men and women, taking the position that Mrs. Stanton 
did not have standing to raise the question with respect to 
male children. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT'S DECISION EVADES THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT AND VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF 
ARTICLE VI, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In the first appeal of this case, Stanton v. Stanton, 36 
Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974), this court rejected Mrs. 
- 5 -
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Stanton's contention that the application of different ages 
to male and female children for the purposes of divorce-decreed 
support violates the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed 
by Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. The court took 
the position that the classification was reasonable, that the 
statute was not unconstitutional, and that if any change was 
made in the age of support the change should be made by the 
legislature. The difference between males and females was 
thought sufficient to justify different treatment for purposes 
of divorce support. 
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court said (at 
421 U.S. 14-16) : 
The test here, then, is whether the dif-
ference in sex between children warrants the 
distinction in the appellee's obligation to 
support that is drawn by the Utah statute. 
We conclude that it does not. It may be true, 
as the Utah court observed and is argued here, 
that it is the man's primary responsibility to 
provide a home and that it is salutary for him 
to have education and training before he assumes 
that responsibility; that girls tend to mature 
earlier than boys; and that females tend to 
marry earlier than males. The last mentioned 
factor, however, under the Utah statute loses 
whatever weight it might otherwise have, for 
the statute states that "all minors obtain 
their majority by marriage"; thus minority, 
and all that goes with it, is abruptly lost by 
marriage of a person of either sex at whatever 
tender age the marriage occurs. 
- 6 -
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Notwithstanding the "old notions" to which 
the Utah court referred, we perceive nothing ra-
tional in the distinction drawn by §15-2-1 which, 
when related to the divorce decree, results in 
the appellee's liability for support for Sherri 
only to age 18 but for Rick to age 21. This im-
poses "criteria wholly unrelated to the objective 
of that statute." A child male or female, is 
still a child. No longer is a female destined 
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, 
and only the male for the marketplace in the world 
of ideas. [Citation omitted.] Women's activities 
and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. 
Coeduation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence 
of women in business, in the professions, in govern-
ment and, indeed, in all walks of life where educa-
tion is a desirable, if not always a necessary, 
antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judi-
cial notice. If a specified age of minority is re-
quired for the boy in order to assure him parental 
support while he attains his education and training, 
so, too, it is for the girl. To distinguish between 
the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving: 
if the female is not to be supported so long as the 
male, she hardly can be expected to attend school 
as long as he does, and bringing her education to an 
end earlier coincides with the role typing society 
has long imposed. And if any weight remains in this 
day to the claim of earlier maturity of the female, 
with the concomitant inference of absence of need 
for support beyond 18, we fail to perceive its 
unquestioned truth or its significance, particularly 
when marriage, as the statute provides, terminates 
minority for a person of either sex. 
* * * * 
We therefore, conclude that under any test— 
compelling state interest, or rational basis, or 
something in between—§15-2-1, in the context of 
child support, does not survive an equal protec-
tion attack. In that context, no valid distinc-
tion between male and female may be drawn. 
* * * * 
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The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Notwithstanding the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court, the majority of this court walked the same 
ground again. It held that it was the function of the 
legislature to make a determination as to the age of majority, 
just as it had before. It reiterated its view that a statute 
is presumed to be valid unless it clearly appears to be in 
conflict with some provision of the Constitution, notwithstand-
ing 3. direct holding by the United States Supreme Court that 
the statute is unconstitutional. 
This court said: 
If in a proper case it could be held that it is 
a denial of the equal protection of the law to 
recognize that there is a difference in age when 
the sex is mature, would it not also be a denial 
of equal protection to enable a female to marry 
at age 14 while the male in order to marry must 
be 16? 
This amounts to a clear rejection of the power of the 
United States Supreme Court to make a determination, as it 
did in this case, that the statute in question was unconsti-
tutional in the context of divorce decreed support obligations. 
It may be true, as the majority opinion says, that "to 
judicially hold that males and females attain their maturity 
- 8 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at the same age is to be blind to the biological facts of 
life," but is also true that to judicially hold that this 
court has the power to overrule a determination of the 
Supreme Court of the United States is to be "blind" to the 
historical and political facts of life* 
One of the concurring opinions takes issue with the 
mandate of the United States Supreme Court saying that the 
direction that the matter should be resolved by the Utah 
courts, "historically has not been considered as an acceptable 
legal concept by our state juridicary." 
And the majority opinion states that "the oath we took 
when chosen as justices of the Supreme Court of Utah forbids 
us to encroach on the duties and functions of the legislature*" 
We have looked in vain for any such "forbidding" in the oath 
of office prescribed for public officers in Article IV, Sec-
tion 10, Utah Constitution: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
support, obey and defend the Constitution of 
the United States and the Constitution of this 
state, and that I will discharge the duties of 
my office with fidelity. 
The Constitution of the United States, which the justices 
of the Supreme Court swear to uphold, includes the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI: 
_ 9 _ 
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance there-
of; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (Em-
phasis added.) 
For 160 years it has been settled law that this Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution operates on the 
judiciary as well as upon the legislature, and that state 
courts are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to interpretations of federal law. Martin v. 
Hunter*s Lessee, 1 Wheat 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). 
This court seems purposely to have evaded the mandate 
of the United States Supreme Court. Although directed to 
determine the age at which divorce-decreed support obligations 
end for both males and females the court has refused to 
carry out the mandate of the United States Supreme Court. 
Moreover, it has left the "equal protection" question just 
where it found it. The court majority holds that support ob-
ligations for females end at age 18, saying that it is not 
necessary to make a determination for males. In doing this 
it relies upon some propositions that were regarded as invalid 
by the United States Supreme Court, as is pointed out in the 
argument below. 
- 10 -
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II 
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF 
THE CASE AS ESTABLISHED IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Before the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Stanton 
took the positions that the support issue was moot because 
at the time of the argument the daughter had reached the age 
of 21 years; and that Mrs. Stanton lacked standing to raise 
the equal protection issue under the Constitution of the 
United States. Both of these arguments were explicitly 
rejected. 
Additionally, it was argued that because of a stipulation 
that was entered into by the parties with respect to the 
decree to be entered in the case, there was somehow an agree-
ment that support would end for the daughter when she achieved 
the age of 18 years. This was also rejected, the United 
States Supreme Court saying: 
We see nothing in the stipulation itself that 
is directed to the question when majority is 
reached for purposes of support payments or 
that smacks of waiver. 
Notwithstanding these holdings by the United States 
Supreme Court, this court took contrary positions. It stated 
that the statute holding girls attain their majority at age 
- 11 -
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18 was constitutional, contrary to the United States Supreme 
Courte It held that the "constitutionality of the statute 
can be raised only by one who had an interest in the lawsuit," 
and stated that neither of the parties in this case had an 
interest in the lawsuit, also contrary to the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court. It held that the "judge and 
the parties to this proceeding all assumed that the decree 
meant that the 'father should furnish the support for the son 
until he reached 21 and for the daughter until she reached 
age 18,1" again contrary to the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court with respect to the stipulation. 
In short, the majority decision is an act of judicial 
muscle flexing aimed at demonstrating to the United States 
Supreme Court that the Supreme Court of Utah is free to make 
its own lawr unfettered by the federal judiciary., In carry-
ing out the demonstration it has lost sight of its duty to 
the litigants and the rule of law. 
Ill 
THE COURT IGNORED THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AS 
TO THE ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED IN THIS APPEAL. 
In advocating equity, one of the concurring judges cor-
rectly observed that this is a controversy between two parties, 
but having so observed, disregarded the issues tried by those 
- 12 -
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parties and suggested the application of "equity and good con-
science" to decide the case* 
But the defendant did not appear as his own counsel. 
He was well represented, and in the district court the 
parties stipulated that the only issue in the case was 
whether the age of majority was 18 or 21. No equitable 
questions were raised or decided, and no equitable questions 
are before this court. 
If "equity" is a factor, the court should consider the 
lack of equity in requiring a litigant to go to the United 
States Supreme Court twice in order to enforce a legitimate 
claim to $2,700. 
IV 
THE COURT INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAD 
SET THE AGE OF MAJORITY FOR PURPOSES OF SUPPORT IN DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
In the majority opinion and in one of the concurrences 
it is emphasized and re-emphasized that setting of the age of 
majority for the purposes of this action is a task for the 
legislature and not for the courts. The statement is patently 
wrong. 
There is nothing in the divorce statutes which prescribes 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the age at which child support money cease. It is provided 
in 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
When a Decree of Divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the 
maintenance of the parties and children, as 
may be equitable. * * * 
Barely six months before the decision in this case, this 
court considered the interpretation of "children" as used in 
the divorce statute, and in Dehm v. Dehm/ 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 
1976) stated: 
Since the term "children" has been neither limited 
nor defined by the legislature in Section 30-3-5, 
a court in a divorce proceeding has the authority 
to order support for "children" so long as there is 
a legal duty on the part of the parents to so pro-
vide. 
Understandably, the court in this case made no reference 
to Dehm v. Dehm, although the decision was pointed out to the 
court in both the brief and in oral argument. 
The age at which support begins and ends in divorce 
proceedings is and always has been judge-made law, and the 
court abdicated its responsibility in attempting to attribute 
the problem to the legislature. 
V 
THE COURT INCORRECTLY DESCRIBED THE ORIGINAL DECREE AS 
PROVIDING FOR SUPPORT OF "MINOR" CHILDREN. 
- 14 -
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In the majority opinion, Justice Ellett states that 
under the original Decree of Divorce the defendant was ordered 
to pay plaintiff $100 per month support payments for each of 
the "minor children" of the parties. A like statement is found 
in one of the concurring opinions. But the fact is that the 
decree with respect to support money did not refer to "minor" 
children. It said: 
Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the 
sum of $300.00 per month as child support and ali-
mony, $100.00 per month for each child as child 
support and $100.00 per month as alimony * * * 
The use of this language in the support portion of the 
decree is enlightening, inasmuch as in the custody portion of 
the decree the court did refer to "minor children." There 
seems to have been a recognition, at that time, that there 
was a difference in the age at which parental custody ceases 
and the age to which parental support obligations continue. 
',. VI ,y 
THE COURT'S REVERSAL AND REMAND DEPRIVES PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT OF COSTS AWARDED TO HER BY THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT. 
On May 13, 1975, the United States Supreme Court issued 
its mandate to this court, remanding the case "for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with the opinion of this court." The 
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mandate also contained the following paragraph: 
IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that Thelma B. Stanton 
recover from James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., Four 
Hundred Thirty-Seven Dollars and Thirty-Eight Cents 
($437.38) for her costs herein expended. 
The parties and the trial court all recognized that the 
plaintiff and respondent was entitled to recover those 
costs, and the costs were included in the judgment of the 
court below. But this court simply reversed the trial court 
and awarded costs to the appellant. It made no provision 
for the payment of the costs awarded by the Supreme Court 
and to that extent directly overruled the United States 
Supreme Court's order. 
VII 
JUSTICE ELLETT SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF IN THIS 
CASE. 
At the time the original decree was entered, Justice 
Ellett was a judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County; 
he heard the divorce and entered the decree. When the case 
was first appealed to this court Justice Ellett disqualified 
himself from consideration of the matter, apparently because 
of his prior participation. When the case was again appealed, 
counsel assumed that Justice Ellett would disqualify himself 
again, but when Justice Ellett took the bench on the day of 
- 16 -
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argument it appeared to be too late to raise the question 
of disqualification. 
Justice Ellett's sitting on the case becomes particularly 
important because in the majority opinion Justice Ellett 
seems to have become a witness as to occurrences at the trial: 
The judge and the parties to this proceeding all 
assumed that when the decree stated that the 
father should be the one to furnish the support 
for the children during their minority it meant 
that the father should furnish the support for the 
son until he reached 21 and for the daughter until 
she reached age 18. 
CONCLUSION 
When this case was decided by the United States Supreme 
Court it was remanded to this court with a clear direction 
that the age of majority, in the context of child support in 
divorce proceedings, had to be the same for both males and 
females. This court, however, has refused to follow the 
direction of the United States Supreme Court and has rejected 
points established as the law of the case—standing to sue, 
among others. 
Not only did this court fail to follow the law as set 
down by the United States Supreme Court, it failed to follow 
its own precedents with respect to the meaning of "children" 
in the divorce code. Moreover, in reversing, it deprived 
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plaintiff and respondent of costs to which she was entitled 
under any theory of the case. 
The court should grant the petition for rehearing, set 
the matter for reargument, and affirm the decision of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. In the rehearing of the 
case,' Justice Ellett should disqualify himself because of 
his participation as the trial judge. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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